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THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA AND 
POLITICAL SYSTEMS: THE IMPACT OF 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ON 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN NEW ZEALAND 
Nicola Lacey* 
This is the text of the 2010 Shirley Smith Address delivered by Nicola Lacey on 8 December 2010, 
organised by the Wellington Women in Law Committee. The lecture offers an analysis of why New 
Zealand has attached itself to increasingly punitive criminal justice policies over the last 25 years, 
and considers in particular how far this has to do with the shape of New Zealand’s political system. 
I INTRODUCTION 
I was honoured and delighted in equal measure by the Wellington Women in Law Committee's 
invitation to deliver this lecture in memory of Shirley Smith. I did not have the luck to know 
Shirley: but I do have the good fortune to count her daughter and son-in-law among my dearest 
friends. What I have read about Shirley Smith's life, and learnt from Helen and Keith, makes me 
wish intensely that I had known her – and deepens my sense of the honour of this invitation. As I 
read about her life, I reflected in particular on the way in which she shone even out of the shadow of 
two very powerful and charismatic men – her father and her husband – in her own rich and 
distinctive integrity. I have been lucky enough to forge my own career as a female legal academic in 
a path opened up by pioneers like Shirley Smith. Having spent three years as the only female fellow 
at New College in Oxford in the mid 1980s, and having managed to complete my own higher 
education without once being taught by a woman, I strongly identified with many of her stories. But 
  
* Senior Research Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford; Professor of Criminal Law and Legal Theory, 
University of Oxford. This paper was delivered as the Shirley Smith Lecture 2010. My warm thanks are due 
to the Wellington Women in Law Committee of the Law Society of New Zealand for their invitation to 
deliver the lecture, and particularly to Ruth Nichols for her tireless work, care and patience in arranging the 
event. For comments on and assistance with the paper, I am also grateful to Karen Feint, Zelia Gallo, Keith 
Ovenden, John Pratt, David Soskice, Hannah Stallard, Helen Sutch and Susan Wauchop. For helpful 
feedback, I would like to thank the audiences at the Lecture itself and at a seminar at the Victoria University 
of Wellington's Faculty of Law.  
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I also recognised something in her with which I also identify: an excitement and energy in the 
pioneer role, however difficult and lonely it can be. So I think that one of the really important things 
about this lecture series is that it will help to keep the inspiration of Shirley's example alive for new 
generations. Women in this country have a proud record of achievement across the spheres of public 
and professional life. The progress of women in the law may make it seem that solidarity among 
women and the fight for further progress is less important than it was a generation ago. I do not 
agree with this: and I strongly suspect that Shirley Smith would not have done so either. The latter 
part of Shirley Smith's career, however, was concerned not primarily with the social disadvantages 
attendant on being a woman, but rather on the effects of poverty and ethnicity in shaping her fellow 
New Zealanders' lives. And it is her work as a criminal defence lawyer with which I hope to 
connect, albeit indirectly, in my lecture tonight.  
Last year, Dame Sian Elias gave a predictably astute and impressively passionate account1 of 
the ways in which criminal justice policy in this country had increasingly turned its back on the key 
question which Shirley Smith repeatedly posed: how do "blameless babes" turn into offenders, and 
what can be done about it. In a searing critique of many of this country's more punitive ways of 
dealing with crime, and in particular of the decision to give the voice of victims a more central place 
in penal decision-making, Dame Sian made a resounding case for greater moderation, reason and 
humanity in criminal justice policy. I agree with every word of her lecture. But I have to confess 
that it was quite an intimidating text for me to read, not only because it added to my already acute 
sense that Dame Sian would be a very hard act to follow; but also because I could hear Shirley 
Smith applauding enthusiastically.  
In my own lecture, I want to ask a somewhat different question, one in which I know that 
Shirley Smith was intensely interested, though I am fearful that she might not have approved of the 
tentative answer which I shall give to it. The question is this: Why has New Zealand attached itself 
to increasingly punitive criminal justice policies over the last 25 years, and, in particular, how far 
can this be attributed to the shape of New Zealand's political system? I should preface my lecture by 
saying that I regard this upswing in punitiveness, which we have also seen in Britain, as deeply 
unfortunate, although I will not have time to argue for this proposition. As Shirley Smith herself put 
it in 1999: "To provide only a prison at the bottom of the cliff is not a solution. Criminals will just 
go on falling into it, at great cost to the community."2 Eleven years on, and notwithstanding those 
huge social and economic costs, ever greater numbers of offenders are falling into the pit of 
imprisonment in this country. Why? 
  
1 Sian Elias "'Blameless Babes'" (2009) 40 VUWLR 581.  
2 Shirley Smith "Kneejerk reaction" The Dominion (Wellington, 17 November 1999) at 12. 
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II THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY3 
Recent scholarship on criminal justice in developed countries has been preoccupied with a sharp 
politicisation of criminal justice policy and a consequent increase in the degree of penal severity. 
The literature is dominated by a widespread and influential diagnosis of "populist punitiveness" or 
"penal populism";4 New Zealand criminologist John Pratt, on whose work I draw in this lecture, has 
been a leading exponent of this argument.5 The salience of law and order in electoral politics sits, in 
the view of this literature, alongside rising crime, economic forces and cultural factors in explaining 
the rising imprisonment rates and punitive penal climate of many Western countries since the 1970s. 
Yet, notwithstanding the obvious status of punishment as a product of political action and the 
general acknowledgement that punishment has been moving up the political agenda, 
interdisciplinary scholarship explaining different levels of punishment in different societies has 
tended to focus more closely on cultural, demographic and economic variables than on political 
ones. Shaped by the prevailing concerns of sociology on the one hand and of political economy on 
the other, the influence on punishment of factors such as cultural norms oriented to solidarity and 
altruism, or of the structure of labour markets, unemployment rates and the distribution of wealth, 
has dominated the effort to understand punishment in its full social context.6 In particular, curiously 
little has been done in the way of trying to understand the impact on criminal justice policy-making 
of the institutional structure of contemporary political systems.7 How, if at all, do factors like the 
electoral system, the availability of citizen-initiated referenda, the relationship between executive, 
legislature, judiciary, the status of the expert civil service bureaucracy, federal structures or the 
distribution of veto points around the political system affect the formation of criminal policy? 
  
3 An expansion on the argument in this part of the lecture, incorporating comparisons with England and 
Wales and with Scotland will appear as Nicola Lacey "Political Institutions and Criminal Justice: the 
Prisoners' Dilemma and Coalition Politics" (2011) Current Legal Problems (forthcoming). 
4 Anthony Bottoms "The Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and Sentencing" in C Clarkson and R 
Morgan (eds) The Politics of Sentencing Reform (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) 17; David Garland The 
Culture of Control (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001); John Pratt and others (eds) The New 
Punitiveness (William Publishing, Cullompton, 2005); Robert Reiner Law and Order: An Honest Citizen's 
Guide to Crime and Control (Polity Press, Oxford, 2007). 
5 John Pratt Penal Populism (Routledge, London, 2007).  
6 Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer Punishment and Social Structure (Russell & Russell, New York, 1968) 
(this text was first published in German in 1939); David Garland Punishment and Modern Society (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1990).  
7 There are of course some honourable exceptions: see for example Lisa L Miller The Perils of Federalism: 
Race, Poverty and the Politics of Crime Control (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008); Vanessa 
Barker The Politics of Punishment: How the Democratic Process Shapes the Way America Punishes 
Offenders (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009).  
618 (2011) 42 VUWLR 
I should immediately confess that I have a special interest in this issue, and in particular in the 
question of how political structures which facilitate coalition politics affect criminal justice. In a 
book published in 2008,8 I suggested that the structure of electoral competition in winner-takes-all, 
first past the post systems like that of England and Wales tends to produce what we might call a law 
and order arms race between the two main parties.9 I now need to tax your patience by summarising 
my general argument, before returning to the specific question at issue.  
A The General Argument  
My starting point was the striking fact that, though most advanced countries saw proportionately 
comparable rises in crime from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s (since when most countries have 
similarly experienced a modest drop in crime), their reactions in terms of punishment had been 
markedly different (see Figures 1–3).  
  
8 Nicola Lacey The Prisoners' Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008) [Nicola Lacey The Prisoners' Dilemma].  
9 This paper is one of a series in which I am working on to refine this broad argument by using case studies to 
isolate and examine the impact of particular features of the political structure to explain the differences 
between (and within) countries with similar forms of electoral system. On the diffusion of electoral politics 
and its penetration of the criminal justice system in the United States see Nicola Lacey "Why Globalisation 
Doesn't Spell Punishment" in Adam Crawford (ed) International and Comparative Criminal Justice and 
Urban Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 214; Nicola Lacey "American 
Imprisonment in Comparative Perspective" (2010) 139(3) Deadalus 102.  
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Figure 1: Imprisonment Trends (1950–2010)10 
 
Figure 2: Imprisonment Trends (1950–2010)11 
  
10 Compiled from International Centre for Prison Studies "World Prison Brief" (2010) <www.kcl.ac.uk>; John 
Pratt "Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess: Part I 'The Nature and Roots of 
Scandinavian Exceptionalism'" (2008) 48 Brit J Criminol 119 and John Pratt "Scandinavian Exceptionalism 
in an Era of Penal Excess: Part II 'Does Scandinavian Exceptionalism Have a Future?'" (2008) 48 Brit J 
Criminol 275. 
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Figure 3: Imprisonment Projections (rate per 100,000 inhabitants; based 
on 2000–2010)12 
These differences, it seemed to me, undermined the diagnosis of a burgeoning "culture of 
control" or "neoliberal penality" grounded in factors such as a common reaction to the economic 
restructuring following the global economic crisis of the 1970s.13 Notwithstanding the increasing 
interdependence of national economies, nation states had maintained striking differences in penal 
policy. Looking at the trajectory of punishment over time and space, we could see a number of 
  
11 Compiled from International Centre for Prison Studies "World Prison Brief", above n 10; Ministry of 
Justice, Research and Documentation European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics – 2010 
(4th ed, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag, 2006) Onderzoek en beleid series, no 285 (available online 
at <www.europeansourcebook.org>); John Pratt "Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess: 
Part I 'The Nature and Roots of Scandinavian Exceptionalism'", above n 10 and John Pratt "Scandinavian 
Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess: Part II 'Does Scandinavian Exceptionalism Have a Future?'", 
above n 10. 
12 Compiled from International Centre for Prison Studies "World Prison Brief", above n 10; Ministry of 
Justice, Research and Documentation European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics – 
2010, above n 11; John Pratt "Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess: Part I 'The Nature 
and Roots of Scandinavian Exceptionalism'", above n 10 and John Pratt "Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an 
Era of Penal Excess: Part II 'Does Scandinavian Exceptionalism Have a Future?'", above n 10.  
13 David Garland The Culture of Control, above n 4; Loïc Wacquant Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal 
Government of Social Insecurity (Duke University Press, Durham, 2009). 
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patterns, widely noted in the sociological literature:14 countries with lower levels of inequality, more 
generous welfare states, higher levels of unionisation and higher levels of social trust, for example, 
showed consistently lower rates of imprisonment. But how were we to move from an observation of 
these patterns or correlations to an explanation of how they were being reproduced over time, even 
amid shared pressures created by a globalising economy?  
In my book, I argued that these differences could best be understood within the framework of an 
argument in comparative political economy known as varieties of capitalism.15 Developed by 
political scientists Peter Hall and David Soskice,16 this analysis argues that there is a distinction 
between liberal and coordinated market economies. A coordinated market economy functions in 
terms of long-term relationships and stable structures of investment, not least in education and 
training oriented to company- or sector-specific skills, and incorporates a wide range of social 
groups and institutions into a highly coordinated governmental structure. Such a system is more 
likely to generate incentives for the relevant decision-makers to opt for a relatively inclusionary 
criminal justice system. It is a system which is premised on incorporation, and hence on the need to 
reintegrate offenders into society and the economy making it structurally less likely to opt for 
exclusionary stigmatisation in punishment. Typically, moreover, the interlocking and diffused 
institutions of coordination of the coordinated market economy conduce to an environment of 
relatively extensive informal social controls, and this in turn supports the cultural mentalities which 
underpin and help to stabilise a moderated approach to formal punishment.  
A liberal market economy – of which the extreme case, significantly for any argument about 
criminal justice, is the United States of America – is typically more individualistic in structure, is 
less interventionist in economic regulation, and depends far less strongly on the sorts of 
coordinating institutions which are needed to sustain long term economic and social relations. In 
these economies, flexibility and innovation, rather than stability and investment, form the backbone 
of comparative institutional advantage. It follows that, particularly under conditions of surplus 
unskilled labour – conditions which liberal market economies are also more likely to produce – the 
  
14 David Downes and Kirstine Hansen "Welfare and Punishment in Comparative Perspective" in S Armstrong 
and L McAra (Eds) Perspectives on Punishment: the contours of control (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2006); John R Sutton "The Political Economy of Imprisonment in Affluent Western Democracies, 
1960–1990" (2004) 69 American Sociological Review 170.  
15 Nicola Lacey The Prisoners' Dilemma, above n 8, at ch 2.  
16 Peter A Hall and David Soskice "An Introduction to the Varieties of Capitalism" in Peter A Hall and David 
Soskice (eds) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2001) 1. The varieties of capitalism framework was developed specifically in 
relation to the "advanced economies" which made up the original group of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Its hypotheses require adaptation in relation to the 
countries of southern Europe such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey and all the more in relation to 
other regions such as a Latin America. My analysis is accordingly restricted to the "advanced economies".  
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costs of a harsh, exclusionary criminal justice system are less than they would be in a coordinated 
market economy. You will have no difficulty in discerning that both New Zealand and Britain fit 
firmly within the typology of the individualistic, liberal market economy (see Figures 4 and 5).17  
Political Economy, Imprisonment and Homicide   
     
  Imprisonment  Homicide 
per 100,000 per 100,000 
 2002/3 2006 2009/10 2008 
Neo-liberal countries (Liberal Market Economies) 
USA 701 737  748 5.2 
New Zealand 155 186 203 1.3 
England & 
Wales 
141 148 154 1.2 
Australia 115 125   134 1.2 
Scotland a 128 140 153   2.2* 
Conservative corporatist countries (Coordinated market economies) 
Netherlands 100 128 94 1* 
Germany 98 94 88 0.8 
Social democracies (Coordinated market economies) 
Sweden 73 82   78 0.9 
Denmark 58 77 71   1.4* 
Finland 70 75 60 2.5 
Norway 58 60 71   0.6* 
     
 Prison rate for 2009
* Homicide rates for 2007  
a Prison rates for Scotland are estimated on the basis of  average daily prison population for 2002/3, 
2006/7, 2009/10 
Figure 4: Political Economy, Imprisonment and Homicide18 
  
17 As Figure 4 illustrates, the liberal/coordinated market economy distinction maps neatly onto Cavadino and 
Dignan's fourfold typology (Michael Cavadino and James Dignan Penal Systems: A Comparitive Approach 
(Sage, London, 2006)): their social democratic and (most of their) corporatist systems are, in these terms, 
coordinated market economies while their neo-liberal countries are liberal market economies. 
18 Compiled from Peter A Hall and David Soskice (eds) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001); Gordon Barclay and 
others International comparisons of criminal justice statistics 2001 (Issue 12/03, 24 October 2003); Michael 
Cavadino and James Dignan Penal Systems: A Comparative Approach (Sage, London, 2006); Peter A Hall 
and Daniel W Gingerich Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macro-
Economy: An Empirical Analysis (Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Cologne, 2004) 
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Figure 5: Coordination and Imprisonment19 
Where do political systems fit into this account?  The organization of political systems varies 
widely of course, both between countries and between sub-national regions.20 But it is striking that 
the two families of the capitalist system turn out to be distinguished not only by differently 
structured production regimes and welfare states, but also by different electoral systems, with the 
coordinated market economies featuring, without exception, proportionally representative electoral 
systems, and the liberal market economies, with a small number of exceptions, first past the post 
  
Discussion Paper 04/05; International Centre for Prison Studies "World Prison Brief", above n 10; Ministry 
of Justice, Research and Documentation European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics – 
2010, above n 11; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime "UNODC Homicide Statistics" 
<www.unodc.org>; General Register Office for Scotland "Revised Mid-year Population Estimates 1982–
2000" (2001) <www.gro-scotland.gov.uk>; The Scottish Government "Statistical Bulletin Criminal Justice 
Series" (20 December 2010) Publications <www.scotland.gov.uk>; The Scottish Executive "Statistical 
Bulletin Criminal Justice Series" (August 2007) CJr/2007/ <www.scotland.gov.uk>. 
19 Compiled from Peter A Hall and Daniel W Gingerich Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional 
Complementarities in the Macro-Economy: An Empirical Analysis, above n 18; International Centre for 
Prison Studies "World Prison Brief" (2007) <www.kcl.ac.uk>. 
20 Nicola Lacey The Prisoners' Dilemma, above n 8, at ch 2–4; Michael Tonry (ed) Crime, Punishment and 
Politics in Comparative Perspective (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007); Michael Tonry 
"Determinants of Penal Policies" (2007) 36 Crime and Justice 1; Vanessa Barker The Politics of 
Punishment, above n 7; Lesley McAra "The impact of multi-level governance on crime control and 
punishment" in Adam Crawford (ed) International and Comparative Criminal Justice and Urban 
Governance, above n 9, 276.  
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systems. This, I argued, makes a substantial difference to criminal justice in a number of ways. Of 
indirect but real importance to punishment, the structure of the political system affects the capacity 
to build coalitions capable of providing stable support for long-term investment in institutions such 
as the welfare state, the education system and, crucially, the more welfarist versions of criminal 
justice intervention whose benefits are hard to quantify and are realised only in the medium or long 
term. More directly, the shape of the political system affects the ways in which perceived anxiety 
about crime or insecurity register in the electoral process. In proportionately representative systems, 
to be brief, there are significant checks and balances constraining executive power, as well as robust 
institutional arrangements facilitating coordination between settled interests and underpinning, in 
Lijphart's terms, a consensus orientation in politics.21 In first past the post systems, by contrast, a 
typically adversarial and individualistic political culture, along with a decline in electoral turn-out 
and in the number of voters who identify consistently with a particular party, has fostered the 
volatility of law and order politics amid an unedifying scramble for the short-term support of the 
floating or reluctant voter.  
Features of political systems, in other words, conduce to – or militate against – support for the 
economic and social policies which make it easier for governments to pursue inclusionary criminal 
justice policies. In liberal market economies with majoritarian electoral systems, particularly under 
conditions of relatively low trust in politicians and declining electoral turn-outs, relatively low 
deference to the expertise of criminal justice professionals,22 a reduction in the proportion of the 
electorate who vote on stable party lines, and a weakening of the ideological divide between 
political parties focused on the resultant floating (or potentially abstaining) voter, with the 
unmediated responsiveness of politics to popular opinion in the adversarial context of a two party 
system making it harder for governments to resist a ratcheting up of penal severity. These dynamics 
become particularly strong where both parties take up a law and order agenda,23 and where – as in 
  
21 Arend Lijphart Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1999); Arend Lijphart Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus 
Governments in Twenty-One Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984).  
22 On the links between different forms of political system and the status of expert bureaucracy see Nicola 
Lacey The Prisoners' Dilemma, above n 8, at 72–75 and 191–192; Joachim Savelsberg "Knowledge, 
Domination and Criminal Punishment" (1994) 99 American Journal of Sociology 911; Joachim J 
Savelsberg "Knowledge, Domination and Criminal Punishment Revisited" (1999) 1 Punishment and Society 
45. Particularly in recent years, the increasing relative importance of political advisors and the concomitant 
decline in influence of the civil service in the criminal justice field appears to have been driven by growing 
domination of political parties by their leaders who multiply specialist advisor appointments in their own 
offices to maximise their control over the policy-making process. Again, this is driven by the chase for the 
swing voter. 
23 David Downes and Rod Morgan "No turning back: the politics of law and order into the millennium" in 
Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (4th ed, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2007) 201; Tim Newburn "'Tough on Crime': Penal Policy in England and 
Wales" in Michael Tonry (ed) Crime and Justice (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007) vol 36, 425. 
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the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand in recent years – economic inequality and 
insecurity has fed popular anxiety about crime so as to mark out penal policy as an especially 
suitable platform on which politicians from all points of the political spectrum may appeal to 
undecided voters. The result, I argued, is, loosely speaking, a prisoners' dilemma in which neither 
party can afford, electorally, to abandon its tough stance, while everyone (other than those with a 
financial interest in the prison build-up) loses from the increasing human and economic costs of an 
ever more punitive system.24  
Conversely, I argued that in the proportionally representative systems of the coordinated market 
economies of northern Europe and Scandinavia, where negotiation and consensus are central, and 
where incorporated groups can have greater confidence that their interests will be effectively 
represented in the bargaining process which characterises coalition politics,25 the dynamics of penal 
populism may be easier to resist. Due to the discipline of coalition politics in proportionally 
representative systems, in which bargains have to be struck, voters can be more confident about 
what policy slate they are voting for – a striking difference from majoritarian systems, where a party 
with a comfortable majority is more or less unconstrained by its own manifesto once elected. The 
result, I argued, is that longstanding proportionally representative systems typically produce a 
significant buffer between a popular demand for punishment and the formation of penal policy.  
III COALITION POLITICS IN ADVERSARIAL SETTINGS 
The ability to form stable coalitions based on binding political deals is key to this argument. But 
what happens when the coalition politics typical of proportionally representative coordinated 
systems occur in liberal market economies? The outcome of the May 2010 general election in 
Britain produced a situation typical of proportionally representative systems: a minority government 
which has entered into a formal, long term agreement with a smaller party in order to govern. Of 
particular interest is the fact that this coalition government – despite being dominated by 
Conservatives, traditionally the party of law and order – is advocating the most moderate prisons 
policy for twenty years. The coalition agreement, and its long term stability, is premised on 
precisely the kind of effective negotiation and policy compromise which I argued had been 
associated with moderation in penal policy in many proportionally representative countries. So can 
we expect coalition politics in the United Kingdom to produce the same sort of orientation to 
stability in criminal justice policy which they seem to have fostered in the long-standing 
proportionally representative systems of Northern Europe and Scandinavia?  
To answer this question, we need to understand how far the institutional features of political 
systems which I have just discussed operate as independent factors, and how far their influence is 
  
24 Nicola Lacey The Prisoners' Dilemma, above n 8, at ch 2.  
25 See Torben Iversen and David Soskice "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some 
Democracies Redistribute More Than Others" (2006) 100 American Political Science Review 165. 
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mediated by other institutional arrangements. In this respect, New Zealand's experience of grafting a 
proportionally representative electoral system onto what had hitherto been a majoritarian, first past 
the post system is of the utmost interest. 
This country presents an obvious difficulty for any argument that a proportionally representative 
political system and consequent coalition politics are necessarily associated with more stable levels 
of punishment, with a higher status professional bureaucracy, and with less highly politicized 
criminal justice. The implementation of multi-member voting proportional representation in 1996 
came at a time when penal severity, as measured by imprisonment rates, had already been sharply 
increasing for the last decade (see Figure 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: New Zealand Prison population 1962–199626 
I am not an expert on your criminal justice policy, though I gather from my reading that 
something like the prisoners' dilemma effect helped to produce this upswing. But, contrary to what I 
would have expected, the period since proportional representation was introduced has gone hand in 
hand with an acceleration of law and order politics,27 with a decline in the influence of those 
traditionally regarded as experts on penal policy, and with an increase in levels of punishment. The 
imprisonment rate has risen substantially, from 128 per 100,000 of the population in 1995 to 203 in 
October 2010 (see Figure 7).28  
  
26 Criminal Justice Policy Group The Use of Imprisonment in New Zealand (Ministry of Justice, 1998) at [41]. 
27 John Pratt and Marie Clark "Penal populism in New Zealand" (2005) 7 Punishment and Society 303; John 
Pratt "The Dark Side of Paradise: Explaining New Zealand's History of High Imprisonment" (2006) 46 Brit 
J Criminol 541. 
28 International Centre for Prison Studies "World Prison Brief" (2010), above n 10. 
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Figure 7: Imprisonment Rate for New Zealand with Political Markers29 
Striking as they are, these overall figures mask a further pattern which would have been of 
particular concern to Shirley Smith: a staggering over-representation of Māori citizens relative to 
their presence in the population. As a thoughtful Department of Corrections Report in 2007 put it:30 
\ 
… Māori make up just 14 per cent of the national population, why do they feature so disproportionately 
in criminal justice statistics – 42 per cent of all Police apprehensions, and 50 per cent of the prison 
population? 
This apparent rise in punitiveness has come about notwithstanding the fact that proportional 
representation has been associated with stronger electoral performance by left of centre parties; by 
consequently longer tenure for Labour governments; and, accordingly, by a reduction in inequality 
  
29 Compiled from International Centre for Prison Studies "World Prison Brief", above n 10; "OECD Factbook 
2010" Statistics from A to Z – Beta version (2010) <www.oecd.org>, specifically economic, environmental 
and social statistics; Gordon Barclay and Cynthia Tavares and others International comparisons of criminal 
justice statistics 2001 (Issue 12/03, 24 October 2003); Roy Walmsley World Prison Population List (8th ed, 
International Centre for Prison Studies, London, 2009) (available online at <www.kcl.ac.uk>). 
30 Department of Corrections Overrepresentation of Māori in the criminal justice system: an explanatory 
report (Policy, Strategy and Research Group, Department of Correction, 2007) at 38. The World Prison 
Brief reports that in June 2009 foreign nationals constituted 20 per cent of the New Zealand prison 
population (see International Centre for Prison Studies "World Prison Brief", above n 10. I have been unable 
to determine the composition of this group but it seems likely that it includes a significant proportion of 
Pacific Islanders. 
628 (2011) 42 VUWLR 
in the lower half of the economic spectrum.31 We have seen that proportionally representative 
electoral systems are, in a large number of systems, associated with a more moderate penal politics. 
What is it about New Zealand which is different? 
In my original argument, proportional representation is itself articulated with key economic and 
cultural features of coordinated market economies: with a tradition of bargaining in which a 
diversity of economic interests – within both unions and management – are incorporated; with a 
long-running multi-party system in which negotiated political compromises both within and 
between parties are the order of the day; with a set of parties which typically represent sectors with 
relatively stable and common interests rather than particular issues; and with production 
arrangements which depend on long term investments in education and training. This alone might 
give us reason to think that proportionally representative electoral arrangements, when grafted onto 
a substantially different set of economic, social and political institutions, would have a somewhat 
different impact on criminal justice.  
A closer look at the recent history of criminal justice politics in this country confirms this point. 
While New Zealand conforms to the left of centre pattern of partisanship characteristic of long-run 
proportionally representative systems in northern Europe, the power which those systems accord to 
small parties appears to have enhanced the political influence of pressure groups advancing a law 
and order agenda, by giving such groups bargaining power, via small parties, vis à vis larger parties 
unable to command sufficient support to form a government.32 Of particular importance is the fact 
that the small parties which have risen to prominence as a result of proportional representation have 
tended to be characterised in terms of their policy stance on particular issues rather than by their 
identification with the socio-economic interests of a particular sector of the population. Parties 
committed to a limited range of issues tend to be attractive coalition partners to larger parties, 
because their specific focus means that a bargain can be struck with them without the larger party 
  
31 See Torben Iversen and David Soskice "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some 
Democracies Redistribute More Than Others", above n 25. Electoral structure, in other words, has 
implications for both partnership and the substance of the political, social and economic outcomes. Iversen 
and Soskice explain this finding in terms of the need within proportionally representative systems for 
multiple political parties to form coalitions, and hence to be able to commit to governing partners – and thus 
to the electorate – about policies to be pursued during a given term of office. Within such a structure it is 
also the case that interests represented within smaller parties forming coalitions have a greater chance of 
finding a political footing, while the volatile force represented by the power of the median voter, who floats 
between the two parties characteristic of majoritarian systems, is correspondingly less, being mediated by 
credible commitments made during the bargaining process. In such a system, where coalition partners can 
hold each other, during government, to pre-election bargains, centrist parties holding the balance of power 
will tend to have more to gain, in terms of economic interests, from aligning themselves with left than with 
right wing parties: the middle classes which they represent have an interest in maintaining good levels of 
public services, and the minority centrist party will be able to bargain with the left of centre party to prevent 
it from moving too far left, with the risk of a substantial rise in taxation, during its term of office.  
32 John Pratt Penal Populism, above n 5.  
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having to negotiate across a range of policies. At first sight, therefore, the New Zealand experience 
suggests that the dynamics set up by the electoral system are rather different in a country in which 
proportional representation is introduced in a society otherwise organised on liberal market lines 
than in one in which a long-standing proportional representation system reflects established class 
interests articulated with the production regime and embedded social identities represented by 
political parties.33  
To deepen our understanding of the mechanisms at work here, it is worth looking in a bit more 
detail at the origins of New Zealand's decision to reform its electoral system in the mid-1990s, and 
at the broader institutional context in which those reforms have taken root. I hope, therefore, that 
you will bear with me while I rehearse the main elements of a history with which you are 
undoubtedly much more familiar than I am. The simple version of this history is that multi-member 
voting based on the German model was adopted in the mid-1990s following the recommendations 
of a Royal Commission and two referenda – and in the teeth of opposition from both the main 
political parties. But this simple account masks the real reason for reform. This was a catastrophic 
collapse of public confidence in politicians' competence and integrity in the face of a long period in 
which the manifesto-burning capacities of the executive-dominated pure form of Westminster-style 
parliamentary system had been exploited to a spectacular degree. A Labour government initially 
elected in 1984 on a basically social democratic manifesto had taken the country in a radically neo-
liberal direction. The country had also experienced an extended economic recession. The legitimacy 
of the entire political system was at risk, and radical change was needed to restore some measure of 
trust. It is almost certainly significant that the move to proportional representation in this country 
itself aspired, explicitly, to increase the responsiveness of politics to popular opinion in the light of a 
collapse of trust in the existing democratic system.34   
There is an extensive political science literature on the impact of the move to proportional 
representation in New Zealand on factors such as the size, range and orientation of political parties; 
the style of politics; the efficiency and decisiveness of governmental decision-making; and the 
stability of governments.35 For our purposes, there are two key lessons to be learnt from this 
literature. The first is that the move to proportional representation has had much less impact on the 
efficiency, decisiveness and stability of government than might have been expected, and that in 
  
33 Torben Iversen and David Soskice "Distribution and Redistribution: The Shadow of the Nineteenth 
Century" (2009) 61(3) World Politics 438.  
34 John Pratt "When penal populism stops: Legitimacy, scandal and the power to punish in New Zealand" 
(2008) 41(3) ANZJ Crim 364 at 371.  
35 See for example Jonathan Boston and Stephen Church "The Budget Process in New Zealand: has 
Proportional Representation Made a Difference?" (2002) 54(2) Political Science 21; Fiona Barker and 
Elizabeth McLeay "How Much Change? An Analysis of the Initial Impact of Proportional Representation 
on the New Zealand Parliamentary Party System" (2000) 6(2) Party Politics 131. 
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particular the adversarial nature of Westminster-style first past the post politics has largely survived. 
The second is that the move to an electoral system which facilitates the parliamentary representation 
of smaller parties, and which makes minority (and hence coalition) government a virtual certainty, 
has somewhat increased the number of parties who win seats, although to a relatively moderate 
degree. Yet more crucially, while the move to proportional representation has, as one would expect, 
led to the creation of a number of new parties, it has not led to the emergence of any stable new 
dimension in political preferences beyond the basic left-right socio-economic division represented 
by the two largest and longest established parties, National and Labour.36 This means that it is in the 
interests of the two large parties to form coalitions which leave their hands free to pursue their 
traditional agenda on socio-economic measures. And this in turn implies that they are likely to be 
relatively relaxed about compromising on particular issues such as law and order where a small, 
populist party makes specific policies a condition of coalition or a confidence and supply agreement. 
Certainly, the Green Party has been successful in gaining a larger number of representatives in 
recent years: but the picture with other small parties is quite volatile in terms of both policy and 
their own stability. Indeed the history of small parties over the last decade reads something like an 
extended soap opera of disputes, splits, re-formations and re-naming: I am afraid that, despite my 
best efforts, and a regular resort to the websites of the various parties (and indeed Wikipedia!), I am 
still not confident I have really got a clear view of it. These parties' number and success is 
circumscribed by the fact that no party can gain representation unless it meets a 5 per cent threshold 
in the popular vote or wins a constituency. The relatively liberal rules adopted in 2005, which allow 
coalition partners to opt out of collective responsibility on particular issues by building a "party 
distinction clause" into their agreements, perhaps somewhat weakens the discipline posed by 
coalition government. Nonetheless, the constraints of coalition government have necessitated a 
greater degree of negotiation between parties, and the discipline of coalition agreements has 
significant force. 
From 1999 to 2008, through three general elections, Helen Clark led a Labour minority 
government in coalition on the basis of confidence and supply agreements with a number of smaller 
parties. Yet in spite of this long period of left of centre rule, not to mention a reduction in recorded 
crime of about 25 per cent between 1994 and 2006,37 the prison population rose significantly, and 
had already reached 198 per 100,000 of the population by 2007. This was fairly clearly the result of 
the Labour-led coalition's feeling the need to assert its tough on crime credentials very much in the 
style of, and for similar reasons to, the Blair government in Britain: in view of popular and media 
preoccupations with crime, Labour saw a tough criminal justice policy as key to seeing off any 
  
36 André Kaiser and Thomas Bretchel "Party System, Bargaining Power and Coalition Formation After the 
1999 New Zealand General Election" (1999) 51(2) Political Science 182.  
37 John Pratt "When penal populism stops: Legitimacy, scandal and the power to punish in New Zealand" 
above n 34, at 364.  
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electoral challenge from the National Party – a particularly salient motivation given New Zealand's 
three year electoral cycle. Notwithstanding the coalition government, the history of New Zealand 
politics during this period is strongly reminiscent of the prisoners' dilemma race for the toughest 
credentials between the two main political parties in a first past the post system. But to understand 
just how this came about, and how New Zealand's electoral reforms may even have left the country 
with some of the most penal populism-friendly aspects of both proportional representation and 
majoritarian systems, we need to add two other (related) factors to the political picture: the power of 
small issue-based parties; and the referendum system.  
A The Referendum System  
In 1993 – against the recommendations of a Royal Commission – legislative provision was 
made for the holding of (non-binding) referenda initiated by the support of 10 per cent of the 
population (about 280,000 signatures). I gather that referenda remain a controversial political topic 
in New Zealand, but it is worth noting that its supporters have included the conservative advocacy 
groups the Sensible Sentencing Trust and Family First New Zealand as well as right-leaning parties 
such as the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT) Party and the Kiwi Party. Only four 
citizen-initiated referenda were held between 1993 and the end of 2009. But – as you know better 
than I do – one of them had a significant impact on criminal justice policy. In 1999, Norm Withers, 
the son of a woman severely injured in a brutal assault, collected the signatures of 10 per cent of the 
population so as to initiate a referendum on criminal justice policy.38 In the referendum, almost 92 
per cent of voters, on an 83 per cent turnout – a staggeringly large majority – backed a:39 
… reform of our criminal justice system placing greater emphasis on the needs of victims, providing 
restitution and compensation for them and imposing minimum sentences and hard labour for all serious 
violent offences[.] 
The resolution contained in the referendum might be seen as illogical – there is, after all, little 
evidence that hard labour and long sentences advance a decent range of victims' needs, while it is 
certainly inimical to compensation and restitution. But this hardly mattered: the Clark Government 
was compelled to support the result, and a mere three years after the inception of proportional 
representation, the referendum appears to have set the tone of a new penal politics, placing law and 
order at the heart of the political agenda. Two years later, in 2001, the so-called Sensible Sentencing 
Trust was formed, and started to operate as a significant social movement, organising protests and 
lobbying in favour of tougher sentencing. Within a remarkably short period of time, the Sensible 
  
38 The referendum was drafted by Graham Capill, then leader of the Christian Heritage Party, and now doing 
fieldwork on the policies he advocated: at the time of writing he is serving a lengthy prison sentence for 
sexual offences against minors.  
39 John Pratt "When penal populism stops: Legitimacy, scandal and the power to punish in New Zealand", 
above n 34, at 371.  
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Sentencing Trust inserted itself as a serious player in criminal justice politics in New Zealand, and 
its impact was felt as early as 2002, with legislation – the Sentencing, Parole and Victims' Rights 
Act – that year encouraging judges to make more use of maximum penalties, placing restrictions on 
parole, and making provision for victims of crime to have a say in sentencing and parole 
proceedings, and the extension of preventive detention to first offenders over the age of 17.40 The 
definition of expertise in the area of criminal justice appeared to have been removed from academics 
and civil servants and handed to pressure groups.41  
B Small Issue-Based Parties 
In the light of this history, it may seem that my argument about the potential power of small 
parties under coalition government pales into insignificance beside the impact of the referendum 
process and of a crime-obsessed media which is not tempered by any robust tradition of public 
service broadcasting. But this would be to ignore two important facts. First, the salience which the 
referendum process gives to pressure group interests potentially increases the power of small 
parties, whose volatile policy orientation makes it possible for them to exploit the political 
opportunity opened up by popular concern with a particular set of issues. Second, the power of 
small parties seems likely to have made it harder for Helen Clark's Labour Government to resist the 
populist demand for tougher punishment. The reason is very simple. At the time of the Parole and 
Victim's Rights Act 2002, Ms Clark's Government was dependent on confidence and supply 
agreements with two small conservative parties, United Future New Zealand and New Zealand First, 
both of which published "tough on crime" position papers that year.42 By contrast, expanded 
provision for restorative justice and strengthened community penalties in the same legislation were 
in part a gesture to Labour's coalition partner up to 2002, the left-leaning Alliance party.43   
In its last two years in office, the coalition Labour government made some moves towards a 
moderation of its penal policy.44 It is interesting to speculate on whether this betokens, as John Pratt 
has argued,45 intrinsic limits on penal populism premised on the need for legitimacy: or whether – 
as the British Conservative administration of the 1980s discovered – the misfortune of winning too 
many successive elections can undermine the law and order agenda where it becomes clear that a 
high profile, tough on crime policy sustained over a number of years has failed to deliver reductions 
  
40 Ibid, at 372. See also John Pratt and Marie Clark "Penal Populism in New Zealand" above n 41, at 306. 
41 John Pratt and Marie Clark "Penal Populism in New Zealand", above n 27, at 315–317.  
42 Ibid, at 306.  
43 Ibid, at 318. 
44 John Pratt "When penal populism stops: Legitimacy, scandal and the power to punish in New Zealand", 
above n 34, at 364–365.  
45 Ibid.  
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in crime.46 In any event, with Labour's defeat in 2008, the moderated plans for sentencing contained 
in the Sentencing Council Act 2007 have hit a brick wall: they sit on the statute book, but seem 
unlikely to be implemented.  
Over the last two years, the nature of the parties fostered by the proportional representation 
environment has attained yet more obvious importance. To reiterate, instead of being articulated 
with long-standing economic, religious or regional interests – as in, say, Germany – most of the 
emerging small parties in this country have been strongly shaped by single issues or constellations 
of issues, becoming the potential voice of the floating or reluctant voters, disaffected with the two 
main parties, which were a feature of the pre-existing first past the post system. These issues include 
crime and immigration. Given the salience of law and order to the pre-existing majoritarian political 
system and the relatively polarized social and economic relations, and high levels of inequality, 
typical of liberal market economies, we might have expected that some of these parties would be 
tempted to focus on criminal justice interests such as victims' rights. Add to this equation the 
additional salience given to criminal justice by the referendum system, and the fact that single issue 
parties are attractive coalition partners for larger parties, in that they do not set policy constraints in 
relation to the economic issues which are those parties' key electoral platform, and it begins to 
become clear why proportional representation, instead of moderating law and order politics, had the 
potential to give them a new spin in New Zealand.  
This potential is illustrated by the recent adoption of three strikes legislation.47 In 2008, the 
National Party regained power, forming a minority government with an interesting mix of support 
from the Māori Party on the one hand and the right-leaning ACT. In a clever piece of electoral 
strategy opened up by the specificities of the proportional representation system, it appears that the 
National Party decided not to push their own candidate in a safe National constituency, making it 
known instead that they would welcome the election of the ACT candidate, that party's leader 
Rodney Hide. Although ACT has been known to poll at less than the five per cent of popular 
support which would normally be necessary for allocation of the seats from the party-based list, that 
one success in the constituency voting, which remains based on first past the post, guaranteed that 
ACT would be eligible for further seats from the party-based list from which representation is 
topped up to achieve proportionality in the House of Representatives. ACT therefore gained more 
seats by winning the constituency than would have National, hence generating sufficient seats 
overall for National to form a coalition. 
  
46 Nicola Lacey "Government as Manager, Citizen as Consumer" (1994) 57 MLR 534.  
47 Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010. For discussion of the run-up to the reform see Sophie Klinger 
"Three Strikes for New Zealand? Repeat Offenders and the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009" 
(2009) 15 Auckland U L Rev 248; Warren Brookbanks and Richard Ekins "Criminal injustice and the 
proposed 'three strikes' law" (Maxim Institute Guest Paper, April 2010).  
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A relatively recent addition to the ACT party list was a lawyer called David Garrett, whose main 
claim to fame at the time was his position as legal advisor to our old friend the Sensible Sentencing 
Trust, that most outspoken and influential pressure group advocating tougher punishment. Elected to 
parliament in 2008, Mr Garrett had, as ACT's spokesman on law and order, the opportunity to push 
for and to shape the Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010, s 86 of which institutes a three stage 
warning regime which is similar to the three strikes legislation in California and the two strikes 
regime instituted in England and Wales by the Crime (Sentences) Act 2003. On first conviction of 
one of the qualifying offences – a relatively wide range of offences against the person including 
robbery – a court issues a warning; on the second conviction of such an offence, the offender 
receives a final warning, must serve the full sentence given, and is not eligible for parole; on the 
third conviction for such an offence, the court must impose the maximum sentence for the offence, 
and the offender will be ineligible for parole unless the court decides that this is manifestly unjust. 
Strikes do not lapse over time. The legislation was passed in the face of opposition from parties 
other than National and ACT, and notably from the Māori Party, which decried the potential impact 
on the already hugely disproportionate number of Māori in prison: Māori citizens make up just 
under 15 per cent of the population, but over half of those in prison, with the disproportion 
particularly stark in the case of Māori women and young Māori men – a dismal fact which quite 
rightly attracted a great deal of Dame Sian Elias's attention in her lecture last year.48 Mr Garrett 
resigned his seat in Parliament in September of this year when it emerged that he had committed 
two offences of his own: an assault, and the falsification of a passport using the identity of a dead 
child. The long term impact of his short-lived legislative career on the prison population remains to 
be seen: in view of late amendments restricting the legislation's scope, there is reason to think that it 
will be modest. But the knock-on effects and the symbolic significance of this successful piece of 
governmental law and order posturing should not be discounted.  
New Zealand's experience tells us that proportional representation is not in itself an exogenous 
factor in explaining penal policy: rather, its impact depends on its articulation with its institutional 
and cultural environment. Within a coordinated market economy cluster of institutions, with sectoral 
parties, proportional representation has served to stabilise punishment; within a liberal market 
economy cluster, notwithstanding its orientation to the electoral success of the left, it produces a 
very different species of smaller party, and it can serve to accentuate dynamics towards penal 
severity by consolidating the electoral influence of single-issue interests. In New Zealand, it was, in 
addition highly significant that citizen-initiated referenda had been introduced shortly before the 
move to proportional representation, the composite electoral package reflecting a desire to make 
politics more responsive to popular demand. This has undoubtedly played into the hands of small 
  
48 Sian Elias "'Blameless Babes'", above n 1. The figures cited here are drawn from New Zealand Department 
of Corrections Overrepresentation of Māori in the criminal justice system: an explanatory report, above n 
30; see also John Pratt "When penal populism stops: Legitimacy, scandal and the power to punish in New 
Zealand ", above n 34.  
 THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS 635 
 
parties, leaving New Zealand with what one might see as the worst of both majoritarian and 
proportionally representative worlds: confronted with a combination of two large parties chasing 
swing voters susceptible of the prisoners' dilemma, and populist issue-based small parties who have 
the potential to shape the policy agenda on issues such as criminal justice which leave a 
government's economic policy-making hands free.  
The New Zealand experience also highlights the interlocking and interdependent nature of 
complex institutional systems. Institutional structure is important. But no single institutional 
arrangement amounts to destiny; for its force is heavily dependent on its articulation with other such 
arrangements. Even citizen-initiated referenda, such an obvious vehicle for the propagation of 
populist penal politics both here and in California, do not necessarily conduce to volatile law and 
order policy. Vanessa Barker's fascinating comparison of the relationship between political structure 
and culture and penal policy-making in California, New York and Washington State49 shows that 
the referendum system had vastly different effects in California and in Washington, stoking penal 
populism and generating the three strikes law in California, while facilitating a richer form of citizen 
deliberation and political participation in Washington.  
Further afield, we are beginning to see that in the long run proportional representation systems 
of Europe, too, it may be the nature of parties generated by the political and social system rather 
than the fact of coalition politics which is significant. In a number of countries including Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, newly emerging nationalist, anti-immigration parties have 
gained a key influence on policy through the medium of coalition politics, swinging the political 
spectrum to the right in the wake of both the social democratic parties' understandable reluctance to 
negotiate with them and their more natural affinity with the political right.50 Thus far, the impact on 
imprisonment rates has been relatively modest. But ongoing research on the number of foreign 
nationals in European prisons suggests that the overall data may be masking a more worrying 
pattern, and that the effective criminalisation of many migrants is exerting a disproportionate 
amount of such upward pressure as we currently see on prison systems in hitherto penally moderate 
countries. Note, however, that while the xenophobic and indeed racist views of these parties are not 
unreasonably associated with the extreme right, they are right wing parties in a very different sense 
from, say, the Tea Party in the United States. For they are not typically against government 
intervention in the economy, anti-taxation or anti-welfare state. Rather, their agenda is to preserve 
the benefits of the local system for insiders. Again, the relationship between political systems and 
the underlying structure of economic production, education systems and welfare regimes is 
apparent.  
  
49 Vanessa Barker The Politics of Punishment, above n 7. 
50 Ian Traynor "Immigration: Far right fringes exploits European Coalitions" The Guardian (London, 15 
November 2010).  
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IV CONCLUSION 
Where does this leave those of us who share Shirley Smith's deeply held view that prisons at the 
bottom of the cliff are not a solution to crime? In case my argument might be seen as a recipe for 
despair about the prospects for a return to a more moderated prisons policy in this country, let me 
end on a more optimistic note. First, it must surely be possible to interpret – or to amend – electoral 
law to prevent any future de facto evasion of the five per cent threshold which is key to the design 
of proportional representation in New Zealand. Second, there are several features of the proportional 
representation system which should, over time, militate towards a moderation of punitiveness. Of 
these, the longer term policy-making horizon afforded, other things being equal, by coalition 
government, and the alleviation of economic inequality, spell good news for criminal justice.  
There is challenge here: to look closely at just how political action can counter existing 
institutional tendencies and to consider how to reshape institutions to temper the unreflective 
responsiveness invited by a simple "yes" or "no" voting structure or the recording of unconsidered 
views, whether at a sentencing hearing, in a referendum vote, or in an opinion poll. There is 
evidence to suggest that, when citizen participation is involved in the formation of criminal policy, it 
makes a real difference how that participation is organised.51 Research on public attitudes to crime 
and punishment in a number of countries show that these attitudes are highly contextual, and that the 
punitive reactions regularly reported in key parts of the news media are not the whole story.52 This, 
combined with the results of Barker's comparisons of California and Washington State,53 suggests 
that a deliberative consultative structure may be crucial. So if referenda could be used as a jumping 
off point not for immediate policy change but for consultation and deliberation through a body such 
as a Royal Commission, with some representation from the relevant stakeholder groups, this could 
make a significant difference.  
The future, it seems to me, lies in the construction of policy-making institutions which are 
accountable to the popular will in the medium term, but not reactive in the short term; which are 
transparent in their operations yet protected from external pressures; and which operate through 
reasoned deliberation rather than through simple voting. As many aspects of our constitutional 
systems show, democratic legitimacy can be provided through a number of means, and not merely 
through the ballot box, the focus group or the opinion poll.54 Just as aspects of economic and 
  
51 Lisa Miller The Perils of Federalism, above n 7. 
52 Julian V Roberts and Mike Hough (eds) Changing attitudes to punishment: Public opinion, crime and 
justice (Willian Publishing, Cullompton, 2002).  
53 Vanessa Barker The Politics of Punishment, above n 7.  
54 See for example Ian Loader and Richard Sparks Public Criminology? Criminological Politics in the 
Twenty-First Century (Routledge, London, 2011). Loader and Sparks argue against the insulation of 
criminal justice policy-making from politics, but our views overlap in relation to the relevance of the quality 
of political decision-making and consultative processes. 
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environmental policy-making have been entrusted to expert bodies and stakeholder bodies under 
conditions of indirect accountability – and just as aspects of the execution of criminal justice policy 
is entrusted to the judiciary – we can surely devise some more effective consultative, advisory and 
decision-making institutions in criminal justice.55 It is time to apply some of the inspiring energy 
and commitment which characterised Shirley Smith's life and to work towards institutional reforms 
which will inject greater reason and humanity, more evidence, less anger, and less short term 
political advantage into criminal justice policy-making. 
 
  
55 This argument is developed in relation to the United Kingdom in Nicola Lacey The Prisoners' Dilemma, 
above n 8, at ch 4.  
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